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The inherent ambiguity in defining what constitutes a "medically neces-
sary" or "experimental" treatment has been the center of much controversy in
the realm of employer-sponsored health benefit plans.' These uncertain
terms, which are found in almost all such plans, classify the types of medical
care that the insurer will or will not cover.2 Insurers will generally cover
only "medically necessary" treatments and deny coverage for "experimental"
treatments.3 As a result, insured participants and beneficiaries, whose only
interest is their own health, argue that the term "medically necessary" should
be interpreted broadly enough to cover any and all treatments ordered by
their physician.4 Insurers, however, contend that the term must be construed
very narrowly, so that coverage is limited and profit margins remain high.5
When benefits are denied based on an insurer's conclusion that a re-
quested treatment is not "medically necessary" or is "experimental," courts
must decide whether the denial was justified or wrongful. If a court con-
cludes that covered benefits were wrongfully denied and as a result, a partic-
ipant or beneficiary was harmed, then that individual is entitled to "appropri-
ate equitable relief' under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).6 The next question becomes: What constitutes relief that is both
"appropriate" and "equitable"? When the United States Supreme Court has
been faced with this question, it has focused almost exclusively on ERISA's
use of the words "equitable relief," giving little credence to Congress's intent
of providing relief that is not only equitable but also "appropriate. 7 This
article considers the Court's interpretation of this issue and suggests an inter-
pretation that reconciles precedent with Congress's underlying intent of pro-
viding "appropriate" relief to those aggrieved.
I. STRUCTURES OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Due to the complex nature of our health system, this article requires a
basic understanding of how health insurance is currently structured and pro-
1. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1684 (1992).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 336
(2006).
5. See PHYLLIS C. BORZI, CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVs. RESEARCH & POLICY, ERISA
HEALTH PLANS: KEY STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON LIABILITY 3 (2002).
6. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
7. See id.
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vided in the United States. The two basic insurance models are private in-
surance and public insurance.8 Under the private insurance model, individu-
als and groups pay premiums related to that individual's or group's "risk of
requiring medical care and the likely expense of that care."9 The insurer's
main concern here is earning a profit for its shareholders.' ° On the other
hand, public insurance is a system whereby individuals pay a predetermined
fixed sum to be included in the program, regardless of the individual's actual
or expected medical care needs." Under this model, the insurer's main con-
cern is assuring that all members in the community have access to health
care. 12 In the United States, public insurance programs provide substantial
benefits to the elderly, poor, and disabled. 13 This article, however, focuses
exclusively on private insurance provided to employee-groups by their em-
ployers.
A. The Private Insurance Model
Under the private insurance model, individuals pay relatively small
premiums, usually on a monthly basis, in return for the insurance company's
promise to pay for any costs the participants or beneficiaries (the insured) of
the plan incur, resulting from covered illnesses or injuries. 4 Some partici-
pants will suffer from severe illnesses which will require the insurer to cover
treatments that far exceed those individuals' premiums, while other partici-
pants will remain healthy, costing the insurer very little or nothing. 15 Due to
this disparity, insurers reduce their risk of suffering devastating losses by
insuring large numbers of people, so that the healthy participants essentially
subsidize the treatment of those participants requiring frequent or expensive
care. 16 Insurers safeguard their economic viability by categorizing partici-
pants based on their "risk classification" and deciding whether they are worth
8. Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L.
REv. 109,110 (1994).
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 110-11. The government's provision of police services is analogous to the
public insurance model in that its citizens pay the same amount for police protections regard-
less of where they live or what they own. Id. at I11.
12. Ford, supra note 8, at 110.
13. GoSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 336.
14. Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Cov-
erage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 665 (2003).
15. Id.
16. Id.
20101
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the risk of insuring.'7 This decision making process is commonly referred to
as underwriting.' 8
In the underwriting process, insurers have broad discretion and use sev-
eral tools such as applications, forms, reports from physicians, and medical
examinations.' 9 If an applicant is approved, the insurer will offer coverage at
a specified monthly premium. 20 The premium is based on the risk or proba-
bility of the applicant requiring covered treatment.
21
The risk analysis mentioned above is determined differently depending
on whether the applicant is an individual or a group. When insurance is sold
to an individual, the insurer will take into account only that individual's
health risks in order to determine the premium amount.22 When, however, a
plan is offered to a group, such as employees, the insurer will assess the cha-
racteristics of the group as a whole and charge each member of that group
the same premium.
23
B. The Structure of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans
Employer-sponsored health plans are an important part of the United
States' health system. In fact, approximately ninety percent of Americans
receive their health insurance through their employer.24 Because employers
providing these benefits must tailor their plans to meet the needs of their
employees, as well as their own financial incentives, employers have sub-
stantial flexibility in designing the plan that they will purchase for their em-
ployees. 25  As further discussed below, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs the administration of employer-
17. Id. at 665-66.
18. Id. at 666.
19. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 666.
20. See id. at 665-66.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 666. The particular characteristics that insurers will look at include "gender,
age, industry of the group's employer, geographic area, . . . family composition, and group
size." Hoffman, supra note 14, at 666. "In many states, insurance providers are not required
to disclose the criteria they use in making insurance decisions, and ... state statutes provide
only vague guidelines." Id. at 666-67; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.062 (2009) (prohibiting the
rates from being "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory").
24. GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 334 (estimating that in 1999, ninety-three per-
cent of privately insured Americans received their insurance from their employers); Timothy
S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts Managed Care, I YALEJ. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001) (estimating that eighty-eight percent of Americans with
private health insurance have employment-based coverage).
25. See BORZI, supra note 5, at 2.
[Vol. 34
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/13
WRONGFULLY DENIED BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
sponsored health plans by establishing uniform minimum standards and lia-
bility for those in charge of carrying out the plans. 6
The structure of these ERISA plans often vary based on several fac-
tors.27 For instance, while some plans are sponsored by only a single em-
ployer, other plans have multiple sponsors.28 In all cases, however, the spon-
sor(s) must make certain important decisions in designing the appropriate
plan. Such factors include the extent of the sponsor's insurance risk, the
sponsor's level of involvement in the administration of the plan, the types of
benefits offered,29 "the methods by which benefits are delivered,"3° "the form
of the plan and the nature of the employer subsidy,"'3 and "the funding ar-
rangement for self-insured plans. ' 32 Although all of these factors are impor-
tant, only the sponsor's insurance risk and administrative involvement are
pertinent to this discussion.
With respect to insurance risk, a plan might be "fully insured," "self-
insured," or some type of combination of the two. 33 In a fully-insured plan,
the employer transfers the entire risk of payment to an outside insurance
company.34 Sponsors of "self-insured" plans, however, retain the full insur-
ance risk, except in those cases where the risk is shared through stop-loss
insurance or another type of reinsurance.3' Along with retaining the insur-
ance risk, some self-insured plans provide that the sponsor fully administer
the plan.36 In self-administered plans, the sponsor makes all coverage deci-
sions and retains all fiduciary obligations to participants and beneficiaries
under ERISA.37 If a sponsor is unable or unwilling to bear this burden, it
26. Id. at 2-3; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
27. Bonzi, supra note 5, at 2.
28. Id. The different types of plan sponsors include "single-employer plans," "multi-
employer plans," and "multiple employer welfare arrangements." Id.
29. See id. at 3. A sponsor may decide to offer one package of comprehensive health
benefits to its employees or put together different plans offering different benefits. Id. at 3-4.
30. BoRzI, supra note 5, at 4. Different benefit delivery methods may include "fee-for-
service," health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
or a combination of any of these. Id. at 5. Any discussion of the details of these different
methods is beyond the scope of this article.
3 1. Id. at 4. "[T]he form of the plan and the nature of the employer subsidy" determines
how much of the cost or financing of the insurance will be shared by the employer. Id.
32. Id. at 5. Self-insured plans may set aside funds to pay for claims in a tax-exempt
trust, usually a "voluntary employees' benefit association" (VEBA) or the employer may not
set aside any funds and pay claims from the general assets of the employer. BoRZI, supra note
5, at5.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. BoRzi, supra note 5, at 3.
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may outsource the plan administration and relieve itself of some obliga-
tions.38
Unless otherwise noted, the ERISA plans discussed in this article are
presumed to be fully insured and administered by the insurer. Meaning that
the sponsoring employer paid an additional premium to an insurer so that the
insurer makes all coverage decisions, bears all of the risk, and the employer's
liability is limited.39
II. EMPLOYER SPONSORED BENEFIT PLANS UNDER ERISA
In order to fully appreciate the issues analyzed herein, a basic under-
standing on ERISA, its history, remedial scheme, and foundation in trust law
is necessary. Section A of this part gives an overview of what ERISA is and
why it was enacted. Section B discusses ERISA's preemptive authority over
state law. Section C identifies the remedies provided for by ERISA. Section
D outlines ERISA's foundation in trust law. Finally, section E defines the
roles of certain individuals subject to ERISA's provisions.
A. ERISA Generally
In 1974,40 Congress enacted ERISA 4 1 in response to the mismanage-
ment and failure of many employer-sponsored pension funds. This sequence
of statutes was necessary to protect employees who were receiving only a
small percentage of their promised benefits or none at all.42 Although Con-
gress's primary purpose for enacting ERISA was to protect employees
through the regulation of pension funds,43 its coverage expanded to include
all employer-sponsored benefit plans.44 In order to remedy the abuse in plan
38. Id. at 3-4.
39. See id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2000). "The provisions of this subchapter take effect on Sep-
tember 2, 1974." Id.
41. See29U.S.C.§§ 1001-1461.
42. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business":
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683-
84 (2001). "Some received a lump-sum payment worth a fraction of the pension they ex-
pected, and others got nothing at all." Id.; see also ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE §§ 2-3
(Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds., 1999).
43. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-406, §2, 88
Stat. 829, 833. "It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect ... the
interests of participants in private pension plans .. " Id. §2(c); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, pt. I, at
1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639. 'The primary purpose of the bill is the
protection of individual pension rights .... " Id.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000). This Act "shall apply to any employee benefit plan." Id.
[Vol. 34
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administration, the drafters applied the "rules and remedies similar to those
under traditional trust law, [which] govern[ed] the conduct of fiduciaries. '
These rules and remedies were intended to further Congress's goals of de-
veloping a uniform federal common law,46 ensuring the solvency of em-
ployee-benefits plans,47 and encouraging employers to provide fringe bene-
fits to their employees.48 Notwithstanding these goals, ERISA does not
mandate that any particular set of benefits or even that any benefits at all be
provided to employees.49
The two sections of ERISA that embody its purposes and goals are sec-
tion 514"0 and section 502.51 Section 514 outlines ERISA's preemptive ef-
fect on state laws 2 and 502 outlines ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme.53
B. ERISA Preemption
Section 514, often referred to as the "preemption clause, 54 provides
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now
45. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076;
see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (explaining that "[t]he objectives of these provisions
are to make applicable the law of trusts... and to provide effective remedies for breaches of
trust").
46. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
It is thus clear that ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employ-
ers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating
complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce consi-
derable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with ex-
isting plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by on-
ly a single set of regulations.
Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11.
47. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at §§ 2-3.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 1-2. The bill was designed to promote the expan-
sion of these plans and increase the number of employees receiving them. Id. at 2.
49. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 465 (2003); see, e.g., 120 CONG.
REC. 4440 (1974) (Statement of Bill Archer) (noting that ERISA would not change the volun-
tary nature of benefit plans).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 514]. Section 514 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1144, the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 502]. Section 502 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1132, the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
53. Id. § 1132.
54. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
2010]
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or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."55 Although this "relates to
clause" expresses ERISA's preemptive intent, it does not indicate how close
of a relationship is required to satisfy the "relate to" language. In 1987, the
United States Supreme Court applied a "broad common-sense meaning," to
the phrase "relate to" and concluded that it meant having "a connection with
or reference to."56 In 1995, the Court narrowed its definition in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,57 when it held that although Congress intended the provision to be ap-
plied broadly, it did not intend for it to preempt state laws that have only an
indirect economic effect on the subject matter of an ERISA plan.58
Even though the Court's definition of "relates to" does not offer much
guidance, the "Savings Clause" in § 514 limits the scope of ERISA from
being read too broadly. This clause provides that "nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
[s]tate which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 59 Moreover, sec-
tion 514's "Deemer Clause" clarifies that self-insured employee benefits
plans do not constitute "insurance companies" that are exempt from
ERISA.6° In other words, an employer that acts like an insurance company
by providing a set of benefits to its employees-such as promising to pay
medical expenses-is governed by ERISA and not state insurance regula-
tions."
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (emphasis added). ERISA further defines an "employee benefit
plan" as any plan "established or maintained: (1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in
any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organiza-
tions representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both." Id. § 1003(a).
56. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (quoting Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
57. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
58. See id. at 661-62.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Section 1144(b)(2)(B) states the following:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be en-
gaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
61. See Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defin-
ing the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARv. 1. ON LEGIs. 233, 234-35 (1997).
[Vol. 34
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The plan described above fits into the category which ERISA defines as
an "employee welfare benefits plan,62 and in fact defines the type of plan
through which ninety percent of Americans receive their health coverage.63
Therefore, the vast majority of health plans in America are all covered by
ERISA and not the different and perhaps conflicting state and local insurance
regulations. 64 This furthers Congress's goal of creating a uniform federal
common law. It should be noted that § 514 also has the effect of complete
federal preemption, meaning that a defendant may remove any lawsuit
brought against it, relating to an alleged violation of an ERISA plan, from
state court to federal court, even if the plaintiff did not plead a separate fed-
eral law violation.65
C. ERISA 's Civil Enforcement Provision
Section 502, commonly referred to as ERISA's "civil enforcement" 66
provision, enumerates the exclusive remedies available in ERISA actions.67
It states as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Describing the term "employee welfare benefit plan" as
follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or un-
employment ....
Id.
63. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
64. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995).
65. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1986). According to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule," a defendant may not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction if the
plaintiff has not raised a federal law issue in the complaint. See id. The Court in Taylor,
however, established that section 1144 of ERISA completely preempts state law claims, and
according to the complete preemption doctrine, there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over
these claims. Id. at 66. "Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action
within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court."
Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
67. See id.; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (stating that
"ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive").
2010o]
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(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable re-
lief(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving delin-
quent contributions
(1) In any action under this subchapter.., by a participant, benefi-
ciary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasona-
ble attorney'sfee and costs of action to either party.68
As a result of three separate five-to-four Supreme Court majority opi-
nions-two of which were written by Justice Scalia-ERISA's remedial
scheme has been interpreted in such a way as to prevent those who were in-
jured as a result of wrongfully denied benefits from being "made whole. 69
The Court did so by interpreting the "other appropriate equitable relief'
language in § 502(a)(3)(B) to exclude entitlement to consequential or puni-
tive damages.7° As a result, injured employees are limited to recovering from
the insurer who wrongfully denied their benefits, only the monetary amount
of the denied treatments-plus costs and attorney's fees-regardless of ac-
tual injuries or costs resulting from the denial.7' In light of the purposes for
enacting ERISA, ERISA's foundation in trust law, and even Justice Scalia's
own words, it is apparent that the Court's interpretation of the civil enforce-
ment provision is flawed.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added).
69. See generally Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134 (1985).
70. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added) (noting that § 502(a)(3)'s provision
for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recovery of consequential damages);
see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 (asserting that the language of ERISA does not support "a
private right of action for compensatory or punitive relief").
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2000); see, e.g., Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc.,
514 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (authorizing the award of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to the prevailing party).
[Vol. 34
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D. ERISA's Relationship to Trust Law
As Professor Langbein explained, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
ERISA's remedial scheme is inconsistent with its roots in trust law.72 After a
review of ERISA's legislative history, it is beyond peradventure that its re-
medial scheme was drafted with the principles of trust law in mind.73 In fact,
ERISA even imposes a rule of mandatory trusteeship, requiring that "all as-
sets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trus-
tees. 74 These trustees are subject to strict fiduciary duties, such as the duty
of loyalty and prudence.75 For instance, § 404(a)(1) of ERISA, which man-
dates that a fiduciary discharge his duties "solely in the interest of the partic-
ipants and beneficiaries," mimics the loyalty rule in the Second Restatement
of Trusts, requiring trustees to "administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiary. 76
Most notable is the correlation between ERISA remedies and the reme-
dies available in trust law for breach of trust. First, the Second Restatement
of Trusts provides that in an action for breach of trust, the injured party may
recover for "any loss" incurred.77 This is analogous to § 502(a)(1), which
authorizes a participant and beneficiary to recover their initial losses, which
are generally the benefits that were wrongfully withheld by the fiduciary. 7
8
Second, an injured trust beneficiary is entitled to "any profits" that the
trustee made in breaching the trust.79 This is analogous to § 502(a)(2), which
entitles the plan to recover for any losses or profits resulting from the fidu-
ciary's breach of the ERISA plan.80 Although § 502(a)(2) entitles "the plan"
to recover and not the participant, this distinction is illusory as recovery by
72. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between ERISA and the trust law see
John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1319 (2003).
73. See id. at 1331. "The Conference Committee explained that the drafters wanted to
'apply rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of
fiduciaries."' Id.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Note that § 1103(b) exempts a few categories of plans. Id. §
1103(b).
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 404]. Section 404 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1104; the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
76. Compare 29 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(1) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1)
(1959).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 205 (1959).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(2006).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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the plan is essentially the same as recovery by plan participants and benefi-
ciaries who receive their benefits from the plan.
Finally, the third breach of trust remedy includes any gains that would
have accrued but for the breach. 8' This remedy is analogous to the §
502(a)(3) "catchall" provision which "act[s] as a safety net, offering appro-
priate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not
elsewhere adequately remedy."82 Professor Langbein explains that this third
remedy should be interpreted broadly enough to achieve the core principle of
trust law, which is to "restore[] the victim to the position that he or she
would have had 'if there had been no breach of trust."'
8 3
E. ERISA Plan Sponsors, Fiduciaries and Providers
In addition to preempting state law and providing an exclusive remedial
scheme, ERISA mandates that every health benefits plan be established and
maintained by a "plan sponsor," 84 such as an employer providing health-
benefits to its employees. The role of the ERISA plan sponsor is analogous
to the role of a settlor in trust law.85 Similar to a settlor's ability to structure
the terms of the trust, a sponsor decides how it will structure the plan that it
offers.
ERISA further requires that every plan be in writing and have a "named
fiduciary. 86 The fiduciary may be any individual, corporation or other enti-
ty--even the plan sponsor-that has control over the management, operation,
and administration of the plan and its assets.87 This fiduciary is responsible
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a.
82. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
83. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1335 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
205(c)).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (2006). A "plan sponsor" under ERISA includes (i) the
employer in the case of a "plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the em-
ployee organization in the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee organiza-
tion, or (iii) . . .[the] joint board of trustees or other similar group of representatives" in a
multi-employer plan. Id.
85. A settlor is a person who creates a trust. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 9 (6th ed.
1987).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 402]. Section 402 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under section 1102; the two provisions are
used interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
87. BORzi, supra note 5, at 18; 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c). Note that in addition to the named
fiduciary, another person or entity will be considered "a fiduciary to the extent that the person:
(1) exercises any discretionary authority or control over the management of the plan or depo-
sition of its assets, (2) renders investment advice regarding plan assets for a fee for other direct
or indirect compensation or has the authority or responsibility to do so, or (3) has any discre-
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for ensuring that the plan is properly administered and must discharge its
duties "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purpose of' paying benefits and incurring "reasonable" administra-
tive expenses.88 Pursuant to § 402(b)(2) of ERISA, a named fiduciary may
delegate fiduciary responsibilities to other fiduciaries or hire professional
advisors to help carry out its duties, so long as the delegation is permitted by
the health plan documents.89 These duties are analogous to those of a trustee
who protects the trust assets for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. 90 In the
event that an insured is injured by a fiduciary's breach of any of its duties,
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502, specifies the manner in which
the insured may recover.9
Finally, for the purposes of this article a "provider" is the entity or indi-
vidual that actually provides the medical care to the insured, such as the doc-
tor or hospital, and who is compensated for such services by the insurer.92
Although generally a provider owes a fiduciary duty to the insured, its pa-
tient, providers that do not participate in the administration of the plan or
decide whether treatment is covered by the plan, are not subject to liability
under ERISA.93
III. AN ERISA FIDUCIARY'S DISCRETIONARY ROLE IN PROVIDING
BENEFITS
Similar to a trustee, ERISA fiduciaries generally have certain discretio-
nary decision making powers, one such power includes the determination as
to whether certain benefits are covered or denied. This determination is of-
ten guided by the specific terms defined in the ERISA policy. Section A
below discusses the terms often found in policies which limit the types of
benefits a fiduciary will deem covered. Section B explains how a fiduciary's
tionary authority or control over plan administration." BoRzi, supra note 5, at 18 (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1) (2006). ERISA fiduciaries are held to the standards of care of
a prudent person, which requires them to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances ... that a prudent man acting in a like capacity" would use in similar
circumstances. Id.; see Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying
the prudent person standard); BoRzi, supra note 5, at 21.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2).
90. The trustee is the person who holds the title of the trust property, in trust for the bene-
ficiary of the trust. BOGERT, supra note 85, at § 1.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
93. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000) (distinguishing a health care pro-
vider from an ERISA fiduciary).
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role may give rise to certain conflicts of interest, and the final section dis-
cusses how this conflict has been addressed by the Supreme Court.
A. "Medically Necessary" and "Experimental" Treatments
As noted earlier, ERISA mandates that all health insurance contracts be
evidenced in writing.94 Although the drafters intended the terms of a plan to
be in black and white, inherently ambiguous terms have turned them grey.
For instance, ERISA plans generally limit coverage to benefits and treat-
ments that are "medically necessary. 95  The term "medically necessary,"
however, has a different meaning to physicians than it does to health plan
administrators or even among administrators and physicians.96 For instance,
''medically necessary" could "mean that a procedure or test is simply not
appropriate or effective for addressing a patient's condition" or it could
"mean that the marginal value of a test or treatment ... over the next best
test or treatment for the same condition is ... minimal in comparison to the
marginal cost of the test or treatment over the next best test or treatment.,
97
Moreover, ERISA plans usually exclude "experimental" or "investiga-
tional" treatments.98 The interpretation and application of these terms has
caused some disagreement among different courts.99 For example, in Cham-
bers v. Coventry Health Care of Louisiana, Inc.,'0° the ERISA policy defined
"'experimental or investigational procedures' as those services that do not
have 'a demonstrated value based on clinical evidence reported by peer-
review medical literature or by generally recognized academic experts. '
In this case, the patient offered expert testimony from two doctors that a
"PET fusion scan [was] widely accepted in the scientific community and in
the relevant medical literature," while the administrator offered testimony
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
95. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1640-41.
96. See William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic
Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 601
(2003); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is
There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 13-18 (1999)
[hereinafter Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs] (noting that the term "'med-
ical necessity' could mean at least three different things").
97. Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs, supra note 96, at 13.
98. See e.g., Hall & Anderson, supra note I, at 1637-40.
99. See e.g., Chambers v. Coventry Health Care of La., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D.
La. 2004); Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. 318 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D. La. 2004).
101. Id. at 391.
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from another doctor'0 2 that PET fusion scans were experimental.0 3 Fortu-
nately for the insured, the court found that the participant had provided suffi-
cient evidence to prove that there was a substantial likelihood that the treat-
ment was not experimental and therefore covered. °4 In Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha, Cos.,105 however, the court affirmed a ruling that a cancer treatment
was experimental.' 6 The court based its decision on an appendix of articles
that had been published several years prior, notwithstanding expert testimony
that the treatment was no longer in its experimental phase and was in fact
"medically necessary."'' 0 7 This unpredictability is compounded by the fact
that ERISA plans often grant plan administrators absolute discretion to in-
itially determine whether requested benefits are "medically necessary," "ex-
perimental," or "investigational," regardless of the treating physician rec-
ommendation. 108
B. Conflict of Interest Resulting from a Fiduciary's Dual Role
In most cases, insureds cannot afford to undergo treatment that is not
covered by their ERISA plan.' °9 Therefore, the insurer's determination of
whether a treatment is "medically necessary" or "experimental" will general-
ly decide whether the treatment will ultimately be provided. As such, many
argue that the insured's treating physician who is most familiar with the
medical needs of the insured is in the best position to determine whether a
treatment is "medically necessary. ''  Others, however, argue that the ad-
ministrator who analyzes a vast number of cases and is more familiar with
the particular terms of the plan is best suited to make this determination."'
There is even a third group that believes that an unaffiliated third party pro-
fessional should have the final say as to whether benefits are covered.
212
102. Id. at 386. Note that the expert offered by the administrator worked as the Chief
Medical Officer and Senior Vice President of the administrating company. Id. at 387.
103. Id. at 386-87.
104. Chambers, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 391. This was a case in which the patient sought a
preliminary injunction in order to prevent the administrator from denying coverage of the PET
fusion scan. Id.
105. 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 707.
107. Id. at 709.
108. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1669-70.
109. See id. at 1637-39.
110. Id. at 1649-50.
111. Id. at1665.
112. See id. at 1674.
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Unfortunately, most plans bestow this discretionary power on the plan
administrators who, in the case of fully insured and self-administered plans,
are the same entities that will ultimately be required to pay for the treat-
ments. ' 3 It goes without saying that such administrators have a "financial
incentive to deny benefits" in order to avoid the direct expenses they would
incur from approving requested treatments." 4 Therefore, an administrator
"benefits directly from the denial or discontinuation of benefits.""'  This
financial incentive to deny benefits appears to directly conflict with the ad-
ministrator's fiduciary duty to discharge his duties "solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries.""' 6
C. Litigating the Denial of Benefits
Due to the potential danger to one's health resulting from the denial of
requested benefits, insureds will often appeal a denial." 7 Generally, before
an insured is entitled to a judicial determination, ERISA plans require that
the insured first exhaust all of the insurer's internal appellate procedures." 8
All the while, the insured may be incurring additional injuries from passage
of time or the financial burden of employing legal counsel. Although §
502(g)(1) of ERISA provides for reasonable attorney's fees in litigation,
courts have consistently interpreted this provision to exclude those fees in-
curred in pre-litigation administrative processes." 9 If the denial of benefits is
affirmed and the insured still believes that the requested benefits are covered,
only then may he or she file suit in a court of law.
Although Congress did not specify a particular standard for reviewing
the denial of benefits, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 20 the United
States Supreme Court focused on ERISA's purpose of protecting employees
and its basis in trust law to establish the appropriate standard.' 21 In Fire-
113. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1669-70.
114. See id. at 1666, 1668; see, e.g., Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 161-64 (3d
Cir. 2007); Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. McKenzie, 467 F.3d 383, 386-87 (4th Cir. 2006);
Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 1998); Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561, 1566-67 (11 th Cir. 1990).
115. Killian, 152 F.3d at 521.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
117. See Sage, supra note 96, at 597-98.
118. Id. at624.
119. See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1010-11 (8th Cir.
2004); Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140, 150 (4th Cir. 2003).
120. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
121. Id. at 115.
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stone, it concluded "that a denial of benefits 2 ... is to be reviewed under a
de novo1 23 standard, unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fidu-
ciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to con-
strue the terms of the plan," in which case, abuse of discretion review ap-
plies. ' 24 Under the abuse of discretion standard,1 2' an administrator's deci-
sion "will not be disturbed if reasonable.' 26 The Court noted that in cases
where the fiduciary has a conflict of interest, such as a financial incentive to
deny benefits, conflict should be considered as a factor in determining
whether the insurer abused its discretion.' 27 Unfortunately, the Court in Fire-
stone did not specify exactly how these conflicts of interest should be
weighed or how to determine whether a conflict in fact exists. As a result,
disagreement among the Federal Circuits ensued.' 28
Recently, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue and stated as follows:
Often the entity that administers the plan, such as an employer or
an insurance company, both determines whether an employee is el-
igible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pocket. We
here decide that this dual role creates a conflict of interest; that a
reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in deter-
mining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in
denying benefits; and that the significance of the factor will de-
pend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
129
122. Note that the Court referred only to challenges under § 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits due.
Id.
123. Reviewing these decisions de novo requires an analysis which is similar to construing
trust provisions "without deferring to either party's interpretation." Id. at 112. Instead, the
court would interpret the terms of the policy in light of all the circumstances and other evi-
dence of intent. Id.
124. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
125. This standard requires an assessment of whether the refusal of coverage is arbitrary
and capricious, reversing the insurer's decisions only if it appears to be "without reason, un-
supported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." Fay v. Oxford Health
Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438,
442 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 102. This standard is rooted in principles
of trust law, because the insurer's discretion in determining what is medically necessary is
analogous to a trustee's discretionary powers. See id. (noting that when a trustee is conferred
with certain powers the exercise of that power is "not subject to control by the court except to
prevent an abuse").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 115.
128. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378-79 (3d Cir.
2000).
129. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008).
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Justice Scalia, however, wrote a scathing dissent primarily attacking the
majority's "totality of the circumstances" approach. 3° He contends that in
light of ERISA's roots in trust law, courts should apply a similar standard to
that of a trust fiduciary with a conflict.' 31 Succinctly, he asserts that the con-
flict described above should not be considered "unless the conflict actually
and improperly motivates the decision. ' 132 Justice Scalia reconciles this con-
clusion with the opinion in Firestone by disregarding, as "throwaway dic-
tum," the language indicating that conflicts should be weighed as a "fac-
tor.' ' 133 Regardless of whether the conflict factor is used, if a court ultimately
concludes that an administrator has wrongfully denied covered benefits, the
injured participant is entitled to some relief under ERISA's remedial provi-
sions.1
34
It should be noted that some states have attempted to eliminate the con-
flict of interest altogether. 35  For instance, in Standard Insurance Co. v.
Morrison,3 6 Montana's Commissioner of Insurance denied an insurer's ap-
plication for approval of "proposed disability insurance forms which con-
tained discretionary clauses.' ' 137 This denial was based on a state law that
gave the Commissioner the authority to deny insurance forms that contained
"inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses or exceptions and conditions
which deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general cov-
erage of the contract." 138 The insurer argued that the Commissioner was
without authority to do so based on ERISA preemption. 39 The court, how-
ever, ultimately concluded that ERISA's savings clause applied to exempt
the state law from preemption.' 40 It noted that both factors of the savings
clause were met because the law was "'specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance"' and "'substantially affect[ed] the risk pooling ar-
rangement between the insurer and insured."",14' The result of laws, such as
130. See id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2357-58.
132. Id. at 2357.
133. Id. at 2357-58.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
135. See, e.g., Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming
the denial of insurance forms containing discretionary clauses); Am. Council of Life Insurers
v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding a rule prohibiting insurers from market-
ing products containing discretionary clauses).
136. 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Id. at 841.
138. Id. at 840 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2009)).
139. Id. at 841.
140. Id.
141. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 842 (quoting Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,
538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003)).
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the one in Morrison, which prohibit insurers from making discretionary deci-
sions is that in the event an insured appeals the denial of benefits, the court
will have de novo review instead of the insurer-friendly abuse of discretion
standard. 14
2
IV. REMEDIES FOR WRONGFULLY DENIED BENEFITS
A. Contrasting State Law and ERISA Remedies for Wrongfully Denied
Benefits
As noted in section I.B above, the vast majority of Americans receive
their health insurance from their employers; and as a result, their potential
remedies are governed by federal law. Those who receive benefits from
sources not governed by ERISA, however, play by a different set of rules.
If an individual is injured as a result of wrongfully denied benefits un-
der a plan that is not covered by ERISA, he or she may seek relief under the
appropriate state law and potentially recover an array of monetary damages,
which are typically unavailable to ERISA insureds. 4 3 For instance, a plain-
tiff might recover compensatory damages, including past and future physical
and "emotional pain and suffering, as well as medical expenses, lost wages,
and .. .other ... form[s] of economic damages." 1" Such economic relief
might include necessary and reasonable medical expenses to correct or miti-
gate an insured's injuries, future nursing care, hospital care, laboratory tests,
medicines, or therapy. 145  Some plaintiffs may even recover damages for
mental anguish, anxiety, or depression caused by the harmful effects of their
injury.146 Finally, under certain circumstances plaintiffs recover "attorneys'
fees, costs, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.' ' 47 The potential
awards under state laws have sometimes proven to be enormous, ranging
upwards of $80 million. 4 '
142. Id. at 840.
143. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (asserting that the
language of ERISA does not support "a private right of action for compensatory or punitive
relief').
144. Stephanie L. Schaeffer, Cause of Action Against a Health Maintenance Organization
Under State Tort Law, in 17 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 193, § 18 (2009).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 113 (Ct. App. 1994).
148. See, e.g., Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps, 802 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding nearly $80 million against Humana for terminating coverage
for a special therapy program for a child with cerebral palsy). Note, however, that the award
was set aside for improper jury instructions and evidentiary errors. Id. at 496-97.
2010]
19
Sheres: The Need for an Equitable Revolution to "Appropriately" Remedy Wr
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
In contrast to the wide array of potential avenues of recovery under state
laws, § 502 of ERISA limits the available remedies that can be recovered for
wrongfully denied benefits. First, § 502(a)(l)(B) provides that a participant
may "recover benefits due to him," "enforce his rights," or "clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan."' 4 9 This provision is relatively
straightforward and means that: (1) if an insured believes that covered bene-
fits were wrongfully denied, then that individual is entitled to bring suit to
recover the cost of those denied benefits; or (2) if there is a dispute over the
meaning of precise terms of the plan, the court will clarify those terms.'50
Second, § 502(a)(3)(A) provides that an insured may seek "to enjoin
any act or practice which violates . . . the terms of the plan.""'' This provi-
sion is also straightforward, authorizing a participant to ask a court to prevent
the plan administrator from further violating the terms of the plan.
The main controversy arises with respect to the interpretation of §
502(a)(3)(B). This subsection provides that an insured is entitled "to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief.., to redress such violations."'' 52 In ana-
lyzing this provision, the Supreme Court held that it precludes any right to
consequential or punitive damages. 153 This means that if an insured was
wrongfully denied benefits, such as a necessary surgery, and as a result his
arm had to be amputated, that individual would be able to recover only the
cost of the surgery, but no money for the loss of his arm. This would be the
case even if the plan administrator knew that the surgery was covered under
the plan and denied the benefits anyway.
Accordingly, the Court's interpretation appears to leave those injured as
a result of wrongfully denied benefits without a sufficient remedy and may
even encourage some administrators to arbitrarily deny benefits. Without a
doubt, this directly contravenes Congress's intention of protecting employees
and "replicat[ing] the core principles of trust remedy law, [which include]
the make-whole standard of relief.'
' 54
149. 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(l)(B).
150. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
152. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
153. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 150 (1985) (stating that the
"appropriate equitable relief' section does not create an implied cause of action for remedying
consequential injuries).
154. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1319.
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V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "OTHER APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE
RELIEF" BEFORE SEREBOFF
ERISA's remedial scheme limits the remedies that are available to in-
surers as well as the insured. Although both sides have sought monetary
relief under the other appropriate equitable relief language, for the most
part, neither has been successful. 5 Section A provides a brief synopsis of
the Supreme Court's initial attempts to define the subject language in breach
of fiduciary duty cases brought by insureds. Section B discusses how the
provision was similarly applied to an insurer's attempt to recover monetary
relief. Section C points out some apparent flaws in the Court's interpretation
of the language, and section D identifies the Court's most recent step in the
right direction.
A. The Law Before Knudson
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,156 the Supreme
Court set the stage for its current interpretation of § 502(a)(3)'s other appro-
priate equitable relief language. 57 In Russell, a beneficiary of an ERISA
health benefits plan brought suit to recover consequential and punitive dam-
ages for the improper processing of her claim for disability benefits under
sections 409118 and 502(a)(2) of ERISA. 159 The Court reversed the lower
court's ruling that pursuant to § 409, a beneficiary is entitled to compensato-
ry damages "'that [would] compensate [her] for all losses and injuries sus-
tained as a direct and proximate cause of the breach of fiduciary duty,' in-
cluding 'damages for mental or emotional distress."" 6  The Court also re-
versed the ruling that pursuant to § 409, punitive damages were recoverable
under ERISA when a fiduciary "'acted with actual malice or wanton indiffe-
rence to the rights of a participant or beneficiary.' 1 6' Because these types of
155. See Langbein, supra note 72, at 1318-19.
156. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Note that this case was decided by a five to four majority opi-
nion. Id. at 135.
157. See id. at 150.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 409]. Section 409 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1109; the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
159. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-138.
160. Id. at 138 (quoting Russell v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Russell 1), 722 F.2d 482, 490
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)).
161. Id. (quoting Russell 1, 722 F.2d at 492). The Supreme Court rejected the court of
appeals' findings that a plan beneficiary could be entitled to compensatory and punitive dam-
ages based on section 409 of ERISA and the accompanying legislative history because that
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damages were not expressly enumerated in § 502, the Court held that they
were non-recoverable. 6 2 This conclusion was based on the Court's assertion
that because ERISA remedy law was so carefully and comprehensively
drafted, any omission of a particular remedy must have been deliberate.'
16 3
The Court supported its conclusion with the pronouncement that in enacting
ERISA the drafters "were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of
plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than
with the rights of an individual beneficiary."'" 6
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan identified portions of the majority
opinion which he believed were "both unnecessary and to some extent com-
,,165pletely erroneous. Although he agreed with the Court's decision that §
409 provides remedies only for the plan as a whole and not individual partic-
ipants or beneficiaries, he noted that beneficiaries "must look elsewhere in
ERISA for personal relief."166 For instance, he explained that the Court did
not decide the issue of whether a fiduciary may be held personally liable
under § 502(a)(3)'s other appropriate equitable relief language. 167 He also
noted that the main architect of ERISA, Jacob Javits, intended for §
502(a)(3) to be used by the courts to work out appropriate remedies in light
of the purposes of ERISA. 1
68
Seven years later, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,'69 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether § 502(a)(3) authorizes money damages for the
breach of a fiduciary duty. 7° In analyzing the provision, it noted that the
term other appropriate equitable relief could mean one of two things, either:
(1) "whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particu-
provision was only intended to provide relief to the plan itself, not beneficiaries or partici-
pants. Id. at 138-140.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47 (stating that "[tlhe six carefully integrated civil enforce-
ment provisions ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly") (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. at 142.
165. Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 150.
167. Id.
168. Russell, 473 U.S at 156 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,942
(1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)); see also Langbein, supra note 72, at 1343. Justice Brennan
also reiterated that ERISA's legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended courts to
enforce the fundamental concept of trust law of "[awarding] beneficiaries ... such remedies
as are necessary for the protection of their interests." Russell, 473 U.S. at 156-57 (quoting 3
AUSTIN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 199 (3d ed. 1967)).
169. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
170. See id. at 249-50. In this case, the ERISA beneficiaries sought damages from non-
fiduciaries who knowingly participated in the fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
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lar case at issue;" or (2) "those categories of relief that were typically availa-
ble in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compen-
satory damages)."'' The majority opted for the second interpretation pri-
marily based on Justice Scalia's assertion that the first meaning was too
broad and would render the word "equitable" superfluous.7 2 In the dissent-
ing opinion, however, Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor
argued that the first definition should apply. 173 The dissenting Justices in-
sisted that the drafters of ERISA intended the term other appropriate equita-
ble relief to be interpreted with respect to its roots in trust law. 7 4 Specifical-
ly, they focused on the remedy for breach of trust, which includes the right to
compensatory damages.175
B. Knudson and Where the Court Went Next
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,176 decided in
2002, the Supreme Court once again tackled the interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief.177 The issues in Knudson differed significantly
from those in Russell and Mertens. In Knudson, an ERISA insurance com-
pany sought reimbursement from a plan beneficiary pursuant to a reim-
bursement provision in the ERISA policy. 178 This provision entitled the in-
surer to repayment for medical expenses paid on the beneficiary's behalf out
of the settlement proceeds the beneficiary received from the third-party tort-
feasor responsible for her injuries.179 In delivering the Opinion of the Court,
Justice Scalia reiterated the Mertens rationale and applied the typically equit-
171. Id. at 256.
172. Id. at 257-58. Another reason why the majority chose the "typically equitable" defi-
nition is that elsewhere in ERISA and other federal statutes, Congress indicated its intention to
broaden available remedies by using the terms "legal" or "remedial" in addition to "equita-
ble." See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-60.
173. See id. at 263-74 (White, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 265-66 (stating that "[t]he traditional 'equitable remedies' available to a trust
beneficiary [for breach of trust] included compensatory damages"). The dissent further em-
phasized that making victims of fiduciary breaches whole by providing monetary relief avoids
the "anomaly of interpreting ERISA [in such a way that] leave[s] those Congress set out to
protect-[ERISA participants and beneficiaries]-with 'less protection ... than they enjoyed
before ERISA was enacted."' Id. at 266-67 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)).
175. Id.
176. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
177. See id. at 209-10.
178. Id. at 207-09.
179. Id. at 207.
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able interpretation of § 502(a)(3).8 ° The Court concluded that the insurer
could not prevail due to the fact that it was seeking to impose personal liabil-
ity on a beneficiary "for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that was
not typically available in equity.'' In support of this conclusion, Justice
Scalia cited the following portion from his dissenting opinion in Bowen v.
Massachusetts.1
8 2
Almost invariably... suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunc-
tion, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of mon-
ey to the plaintiff are suits for "money damages," as that phrase
has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than com-
pensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of [a] le-
gal duty.'
83
Based on this rationale, Justice Scalia rejected the insurer's claim that
its cause of action for reimbursement should be classified as injunctive relief,
a typically equitable remedy.' 84 The Court noted that only in rare cases, such
as those that would avoid future losses, would the Court of Equity specifical-
ly enforce a contract to transfer funds. 185 The Court also rejected the insur-
er's argument that it was seeking the typically equitable remedy of restitu-
tion. 86 As dicta, the Court stated that in order to seek equitable restitution,
one must ordinarily do so "in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable
lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to
the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the de-
fendant's possession."'' 87 Finally, the Court concluded that the "restitution"
sought by the insurer is not equitable but a "freestanding claim for money
damages."'' 8
8
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens wrote strong dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens emphasized that he agreed with Justice Ginsburg that it is
unlikely that the 1974 Congress "intended to revive the obsolete distinctions
180. Id. at 209-10 (stating that "'[e]quitable' relief must mean something less than all
relief.' ... [It] must refer to 'those categories of relief that were typically available in equity"')
(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. at 256, 258 n.8 (1993)).
181. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210.
182. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
183. Id. at 918-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210-11. The insurer argued that it was seeking to enjoin
the beneficiaries from refusing to perform as required by the reimbursement provision in the
contract. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at212-18.
187. Id. at213.
188. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 219 n.4.
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between law and equity ... for defining the remedies" under ERISA.189 Fur-
ther, he noted that he understood § 502(a)(3)(B) to authorize any appropriate
order that would remedy a violation of an ERISA plan, regardless of what
was available in English chancery courts.' 90 Justice Ginsburg elaborated on
how unreasonable it was for the majority to focus on ancient classifications
and emphasized that principles of equity are flexible and were introduced to
accommodate the changing needs of society. 9 '
C. Flaws in the "Typically Equitable" Definition
As a result of Russell, Mertens, and Knudson, relief available under §
502(a)(3)(B) has been limited to the specific classes of remedies that Justice
Scalia would consider typically equitable, such as mandamus, injunction, and
restitution. 192 This narrow interpretation of typically equitable remedies ex-
cludes the possibility of recovering compensatory damages primarily be-
cause Justice Scalia believes that suits for money are essentially actions at
law and therefore not equitable. 93 There are several flaws in this interpreta-
tion. First, as Professor Langbein explained, mandamus was exclusively a
common law remedy and never typically equitable.'94 Second, although the
Court asserted that restitution is typically equitable, the law of restitution was
only created after the fusion of the courts by the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of Restitution (1937), by integrating the equitable rule of
constructive trusts and common law rule of quasi-contract.' 95 Finally, and
most significantly, Justice Scalia's interpretation erroneously excludes mone-
tary damage awards because he considered them to be the "classic form of
legal relief."'' 96 This interpretation ignores the fact that the payment of mon-
ey is in fact a "classic form of equitable relief' for trust beneficiaries seeking
equitable redress for a fiduciary's breach of trust. 197 In fact, the Uniform
Trust Code clearly states that in order "[t]o remedy a breach of trust, ... the
court may... compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying mon-
ey." 98 Keeping in mind that ERISA was drafted based on trust law and the
189. Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 228, 233 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
193. See id. at 255-56.
194. See Langbein, supra note 72, at 1353-54 (noting the origins of a writ of mandamus in
English common law).
195. Id. at 1357.
196. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
197. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1352.
198. UNIF. TRuSTCODE § 1001(b)(3) (2000) (amended 2004, 2005) (emphasis added).
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fact that an ERISA fiduciary's breach of its duty is analogous to a breach of
trust, Congress likely intended § 502(a)(3)(B) to include monetary relief.
D. A Step in the Right Direction
Four years after Knudson, the Supreme Court decided Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.'99 In Sereboff, the Court once again took on
ERISA's other appropriate equitable relief language.200 The facts of Sere-
boff were essentially the same as those in Knudson.2°' Without abrogating or
overruling Knudson, however, the Court enforced an ERISA plan's reim-
bursement provision based on the typically equitable theory of constructive
trust.20 2 The Court distinguished the two cases on a fact that seems arbitrary
and may actually encourage fraudulent and unethical conduct. °3 In essence,
the Court enabled an insurer to enforce a monetary reimbursement provision
of an ERISA plan based on semantics and quick thinking. 2°4 Succinctly,
because the typically equitable definition of § 502(a)(3)(B) would not permit
the insurer to assert a cause of action for reimbursement under the terms of
the plan, the insurer merely re-classified the remedy sought as one for a con-
structive trust over the specific trust in which the settlement proceeds were
deposited.2 °5
The result in Sereboff is bitter-sweet. The Court took a step in the right
direction by permitting the recovery of money to be considered other appro-
priate equitable relief The method used to achieve this result, however, will
be difficult for insureds to take advantage of when seeking money for wrong-
fully denied benefits. This is due to the fact that when an insurer denies a
request for benefits, it generally does not earmark and deposit money that
would make an injured insured whole into a separate fund over which a con-
structive trust may be imposed.
VI. PROPERLY DEFINING "OTHER APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF"
Without regard to the plan administrator's underlying motivation, the
fact remains that courts have and will continue to conclude, from time to
199. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
200. See id. at 361.
201. Robert C. Sheres, Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA Reimbursement
Actions, 31 NOVA L. REV. 187, 201-02 (2006) (comparing Sereboff and Knudson).
202. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 367-69.
203. See Sheres, supra note 201, at 208-10.
204. See id.
205. For a detailed discussion on Sereboff, see Sheres, supra note 201.
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time, that covered benefits were wrongfully denied.206 The type of benefit
denied and the resulting injuries vary from case to case. For instance, an
insurer might deny coverage for extended hospital stays,20 7 prescription
drugs,2 °8 or crucial surgeries.2°9 As a result of the denial, the insured might
incur injuries ranging from allergic reactions, 210 to the loss of a limb211 or
even death.12 In spite of the devastating losses and injuries that may result
from a wrongful denial, insureds under an ERISA plan are limited to relief
under § 502, which currently precludes consequential and punitive damag-
es. 213 As a result, injured participants and beneficiaries are without appropri-
ate relief to redress the damages caused by plan administrators.
This unjust result stems from the Supreme Court's unbalanced emphasis
on Congress's use of the word "equitable" in § 502(a)(3)(B) and disregard
for the fact that such relief must also be "appropriate." If Justice Scalia was
correct, then every word used in ERISA's remedial scheme was deliberate,
including the word "appropriate." Although the Court has stated that when
considering the meaning of "appropriate" equitable relief, courts should
"keep in mind the 'special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,"' 214
it does not appear to have done so itself. The primary purposes of ERISA
are to provide benefits to and protect employees. Therefore, the remedies
available to those employees should redress the specific injury incurred by
the employee.
A. Typically Equitable and Appropriate Remedies
The current interpretation of other appropriate equitable relief limits
the remedies available to those typically equitable remedies identified by the
Court which include injunction and equitable restitution.2 5 Courts are given
a "high degree of discretion" when awarding these remedies, enabling them
to be flexible and "measure, shape or tailor relief to fit [the court's] view" of
206. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004).
207. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992).
208. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 205.
209. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 362-63 (2002).
210. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 205.
211. See, e.g., Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
212. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Cigna Healthcare of Me., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290 (D.
Me. 2008).
213. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
214. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
215. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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what is fair in a particular situation.216 As such, courts should use the flex-
ibility of these equitable remedies to alleviate the damage caused by the
wrongfully denied benefits.
1. Injunction
An injunction is a command from the court to a defendant requiring the
defendant to act or avoid acting in a certain way.217 Due to their flexible
nature, injunctions have been used in a variety of ways to prevent violations
of rights, restore "rights that have already been violated," and even "establish
rights" that did not otherwise already exist.218 Because there is no general
limiting principal, an "injunction is a potential remedy in any case in which it
may provide significant benefits that are greater that its costs or disadvantag-
es. ' 219 The following are a few examples on how injunctive relief may be
fashioned to "appropriately" remedy wrongfully denied benefits in particular
situations.
In Wickline v. State,22° Mrs. Wickline, a plan beneficiary underwent
several major surgeries on her nerves and arteries. 22' After the surgeries, the
plan administrator rejected the surgeon's determination that Mrs. Wickline
should remain in the hospital for eight additional days.222 As a result, she
was discharged. 2 3 While at home, her leg became infected and ultimately
had to be amputated. 224 The surgeon concluded to a medical certainty, that
had Mrs. Wickline remained in the hospital for the entire eight days, as he
suggested, she would not have lost her leg. 25 Therefore, in this instance, the
wrongful denial of benefits resulted in the loss of Mrs. Wickline's leg. Even
though a court could not award compensatory damages to Mrs. Wickline or a
similarly situated insured for their loss, perhaps it could use its injunctive
powers to fashion an appropriate remedy. For instance, it might issue an
injunction requiring the plan administrator to provide Mrs. Wickline with a
216. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.4(1), at 67
(2d ed. 1993).
217. Id. § 2.9(1), at 162.
218. Id. § 2.9(2), at 165.
219. Id. at 166.
220. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
221. Id. at 812-13. Note that although this was not an ERISA case, the same concept
would apply.
222. Id. at 813-15.
223. Id. at 815.
224. Id. at 816.
225. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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prosthetic leg and rehabilitative therapy.226 Of course the administrator will
argue that requiring the plan to pay for such relief is essentially the same as
awarding consequential damages. This argument should fail in light of the
Court's ruling in Sereboff, which permitted an insurer to recover money by
fashioning a method in which the money was recovered as equitable.
In Jacobs v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc. ,227 an ERISA plan be-
neficiary was bulimic, however the administrator refused to pay for any out-
of-plan treatment because it considered alternative treatments available from
the plan provider to be reasonable.228 The court ultimately determined that
the treatment provided by the plan provider was not reasonable and therefore
benefits for the requested out-of-plan treatment were wrongfully denied.2 29 If
a court was faced with a similar situation, its injunctive power could be used
to order the plan to adopt a form of bulimia treatment that is reasonable.
Because bulimia is often a lifelong struggle, this prospective remedy may be
"appropriate."
In Nolte v. BellSouth Corp.,23° the plaintiff brought a class action suit
for breach of fiduciary duty, under ERISA §502(a)(3)(B), against the plan
administrator for improperly denying benefits under a Short Term Disability
Plan (STDP). 3' She alleged that the administrators failed to apply the cor-
rect definition of the term "disability. 2 32 As an appropriate equitable reme-
dy, the plaintiff asked the court
to order the removal and replacement of the alleged breaching fi-
duciaries .... further enjoin the violation of the fiduciary duties
owed to Plaintiff, . . . [and] appoint an "independent neutral body
to substitute for those removed fiduciar[ies],". . . which would
reopen "each [STDP] claim" and determine whether the claim
warranted an award of disability benefits.
2 33
226. Note that the administrator will likely argue that requiring the plan to pay for these
additional treatments is the same as giving the patient the money and therefore essentially the
equivalent of awarding her consequential damages. The administrator might also argue that
this type of remedy does not serve ERISA's purposes because the funds would be taken out of
the plan's account and therefore cause all plan members to bear the cost, possibly raising
premiums.
227. 265 Fed. Appx. 652 (9th Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 653-54.
229. Id. at 654.
230. No. 1:06-cv-762-WSD, 2007 WL 120842 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2007).
231. Id. at*l.
232. Id. at *2.
233. Id.
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The plaintiff further requested "an order establishing an administrative com-
mittee to audit and review" the administrator's compliance with the previous
order and disgorging all profits realized from past violations.2 34 Although the
court dismissed the plaintiff's case, it did not refute that this type of injunc-
tive relief could be "appropriate equitable relief. 2 35 In fact, in Russell, the
Supreme Court specified that the phrase "other equitable or remedial relief'
as used in § 409(a) of ERISA is similar to "other appropriate equitable relief'
in §502(a)(3)(B) and includes the "removal of [a breaching] fiduciary. 2
36
Another potential equitable remedy might be an order requiring admin-
istrators who have previously been found to have wrongfully denied benefits
to refer all future benefit disputes for external review at the administrator's
cost. "External review is a formal process to resolve disputes between health
plans and patients by submitting those disputes to expert decision makers,
independent from either the health plan or the patient., 237 It has been shown
that external review uncovers that approximately fifty percent of the re-
viewed decisions by administrators were incorrect; therefore, this would like-
ly be a very effective way of preventing future wrongful denials.
238
It should be noted that courts have used their injunctive power to award
monetary relief in an effort to make whole those aggrieved.239 For example,
in Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., ° the court held that pre-
judgment interest on late benefit payments does not constitute an award of
compensatory damages.24n In fact, the court held that if "interest is sought to
make the plaintiff whole by eliminating the effect of a defendant's breach of
234. Id.
235. See Nolte, 2007 WL 120842, at *6, *7. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs case
asserting that pursuant to Varity Corp. v. Howe, a plaintiff cannot seek remedies under §
502(a)(3) when other remedies are available through another specific provision of ERISA
such as § 502(a)(l)(B). Id. at *6. Note, however, that other courts have interpreted Varity
Corp. differently. See, e.g., Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89-90
(2d Cir. 2001) ("Varity Corp. did not eliminate a private cause of action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty when another potential remedy is available; instead, the district court's remedy is
limited to such equitable relief as is considered appropriate.").
236. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142, 150 (1985) (It is abundantly
clear that ERISA's "draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan
assets").
237. Kathy Cerminara, Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking
Last-Chance Therapies (Even When the Answer is "NO"), 15 HEALTH MATRIx 285, 306
(2005).
238. See id. at 311.
239. See id. at 327.
240. 277 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 229.
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a fiduciary duty, [there is] no reason why such interest should not be deemed
'appropriate equitable relief within the scope of § 502(a)(3)(B). ' ' 42
2. Equitable Restitution
In addition to its injunctive power, a court may also use the remedy of
restitution to assist in making an injured participant or beneficiary whole
after being wrongfully denied benefits. 243 Dan Dobbs explains that although
in some cases restitution may provide compensation for a plaintiff, the goal
of restitution, "is to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by making
him give up what he wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff."'2" There are
several different types of equitable restitution including: "(1) the construc-
tive trust, (2) the equitable lien, (3) subrogation, (4) . . . accounting for prof-
its," (5) equitable rescission, and (6) reformation of instruments. 45 Due to
the flexible nature of equitable remedies and the court's discretionary power,
it is likely that several of these restitutionary remedies could be used in crea-
tive ways to address wrongful denials of benefits. This portion of the article
will discuss the possible use of reformation and equitable rescission to
achieve this goal.
Reformation is a traditionally equitable remedy which enables the court
to alter a contract so that it more accurately meets the agreement of the par-
ties.246 This remedy, however, may also be used to reform or alter a contract
to meet other legal standards such as the doctrine in insurance law which
requires insurance policies to meet an insured's reasonable expectations.247
Such expectations may have arisen from brochures or other representations
by the insurer or administrator, despite contrary provisions in the written
policy.248 Therefore, if in a particular case the court finds that as a result of a
plan administrator's representations, a participant or beneficiary reasonably
expected certain benefits to be covered, a plan that excludes these benefits
should be reformed to meet the expectations of that participant or benefi-
ciary.
Equitable rescission is a court order that causes a contract to be "un-
made," meaning that all benefits received under the contract are restored to
242. Id.
243. See DOBBS, supra note 216 § 1.1, at 4.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 4.3(1), at 391-92.
246. Id. at § 4.3(7), at 416.
247. Id. at § 4.3(7), at 418 (citing Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Ex-
pectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825 (1990)).
248. DOBBS, supra note 216 § 4.3(7), at 418.
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their original party.249 Generally, the benefits received by the plan adminis-
trator are the premiums paid by the participant, and the benefits received by
the participant would be the medical services rendered. Therefore, if the
participant has paid more in premiums than he has received in benefits be-
fore being wrongfully denied, perhaps a court would award the difference to
the insured. Of course, the participant would now no longer have any insur-
ance, which may not be the most desirable result.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Knudson, while referring to the majority's interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief, Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent that "[i]t is
particularly ironic that the [Court] acts in the name of equity as it sacrifices
congressional intent and statutory purpose to archaic and unyielding doc-
trine. '250 This emphasizes the fact that ERISA was enacted to protect em-
ployees and provide them with "appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts. '251 The current interpretation of § 502(a)(3)(B)
contravenes this goal by refusing to allow participants and beneficiaries to be
made whole by way of consequential damages. What makes this fact even
more troubling is that an award of consequential damages was in fact a tradi-
tionally equitable remedy for breach of trust, the theory upon which
ERISA's remedial scheme is based. Although the decision in Sereboff re-
quired that the compensatory damages awarded be cloaked as equitable re-
lief,2 52 hopefully courts will view that decision as the beginning of equitable
revolution relieving ERISA insureds from the Court's flawed and archaic
limitations on available remedies.
For the time being, it appears as though counsel for the insured will
need to be creative in fashioning the relief they seek so that it will be consi-
dered traditionally equitable. This author suggests, however, that a clear
declaration by the Supreme Court that the proper interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief is the one that Justice Scalia and the majority in
Mertens disposed of as too broad. Until this is done, courts should use their
discretionary power to mold the currently permissible remedies such as in-
junction, restitution, and rescission to provide equitable relief that appro-
priately addresses the injuries caused by the wrongful denials of covered
benefits.
249. Id. at § 4.3(6), at 414.
250. Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 228 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
252. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2006).
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